Joe Biden was officially sworn in on January 4, 2021 as the 46th President of the United States. This election was a relief in many diplomatic citadels with regard to the risk of war caused by the bellicose management of many sensitive international issues by the former US administration. Among these sensitive international issues stands the Iranian nuclear program. Since the unilateral and unjustified withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA in 2018 has led Iran to gradually free itself from all of its obligations under this agreement signed in 2015. Among the retaliatory measures adopted are the decision to resume enrichment of uranium at 20%, which has raised serious fears among Western powers regarding the risk of Iran producing a nuclear bomb. What factors can explain such a situation of animosity? In other words, why has Iran made such a decision with serious regional consequences? How advanced is Iran’s nuclear program and therefore its ability to produce a nuclear bomb?

            Iran Government spokesman Ali Rabie announced on January 4, 2021 the resumption of enrichment activities for its uranium up to 20%. This was done in retaliation by the Iranian government following the assassination of scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, considered to be the mastermind of Iran’s nuclear program. Although there have been no official claims from the Israeli government, several experts agree on the responsibility of the Israeli secret service in this assassination. [1] In addition, the Iranian parliament recently adopted a bill inviting the government to stop respecting the additional protocol of the IAEA which authorized unannounced inspections in the nuclear installations and certain military bases of the country. It is important to stress that Iran had already adopted similar retaliatory measures in the context of the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani. [2] Therefore, the decision to resume enrichment activities up to 20% appears to be a logical continuation in its policy of counter-attacks against the economic cost of the sanctions imposed on it. Combined with the unilateral sanctions imposed by the previous US administration, the assassination of this eminent scientist had enormous political impact beyond the technical implications for Iran’s nuclear program. What is the state of Iran’s nuclear program? Is Iran already capable of producing an atomic bomb?

                        The production of an atomic bomb depends on both technical and political factors. Regarding the technical aspects, it would require centrifuges, fissile material and a delivery system. According to official reports, Iran meets two of the conditions listed above, the most problematic of which is the mastering of the enrichment cycle that produces fissile material. The level of enrichment is critical in the production of fissile material necessary for the production of a bomb. Between 1% and 19%, (LEU) Uranium is enriched for exclusively civilian or peaceful purposes. From 20%, enrichment is problematic because it makes it possible to reach the critical threshold of 90% (HEU) which gives access to the nuclear bomb. [3] Therefore, it is logical that Iran’s decision to enrich its 20% uranium is a source of concern in the West. Regarding the political conditions, the State should resolutely embark on the path of nuclearisation, as North Korea did, which is not yet the case for Tehran considering the Fatwa of  the Supreme Leader which prohibits the production of nuclear weapons. From this perspective, it is too early to panic. Moreover, the compromise recently reached between Iran and the IAEA on a minimum implementation of the additional protocol is a signal that Iran wants the preservation of the JCPOA.[4]

            The preservation of the JCPOA therefore appears to be the keystone likely to resolve the current crisis between Tehran and Washington. However, Iran request beforehand the lifting of sanctions imposed on its economy by the Trump administration. While the Biden administration has also indicated its willingness to return to the JCPOA, they also request Iran’s initial return in the JCPOA, which leads  to a brinkmanship scenario. The solution proposed by Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif of a synchronized return of both sides under EU auspices seems a middle-ground approach acceptable to both sides. The upcoming Iranian presidential elections might put the Biden administration in a difficult bargaining position with Iran. A bold political action is therefore urgently required.

[1]          Bunkall, Alistair, The meticulous planning behind assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist, Sky News, 2021.

[2]          Marcus Jonathan,Iran rolls back nuclear deal commitments,BBC, 2020.

Kosovo’s February 14th parliamentary elections mark a major turning point since the post-war period. Self-determination Movement (LVV) a left-wing party, emerged as the leading force in Kosovo, leaving behind the Democratic Party of Kosovo known as the war wing party and the Democratic League of Kosovo known as the non-violent party of former historic President Ibrahim Rugova, as well the oldest party in Kosovo. This victory of LVV was expected because it comes after a long journey of its leader Albin Kurti to come to a great victory like this. The pro-LVV vote is also seen as a punishment for past governments, a punishment for corruption and bad governance.

Preliminary results published on Monday by the Central Election Commission show that the LVV has won 47.85% which translates roughly to 52 seats on the 120 seat National Assembly. The Democratic Party of Kosovo 17.41% and the Democratic League of Kosovo 13.08%, the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, AAK, received about 7.43 per cent, without counting the conditional and postal votes which are expected to increase the percentage of LVV. A great push towards the victory of LVV was given by the union of acting President of Kosovo Vjosa Osmani, who was previously part of the LDK after disagreements she had with her former party over the previous coalition with LVV.

Immediately after the announcement of the first results on the evening of February 14, the second party in the country, the Democratic Party of Kosovo, in a press conference congratulated the winner of the elections and stated that it would not cooperate with LVV to form the new government. This puts PDK for the second term in the row in the role of the opposition in Kosovo. PDK lost its two prominent leaders, former President Thaci and former Speaker of the National Assembly Veseli to the Specialized Court Chambers after the indictment was published accusing them of crimes committed post 1999. After losing almost half of its voters, LDK held an emergency meeting where its leadership resigned taking responsibility for the disaster. Isa Mustafa was former Prime Minister of Kosovo in 2014 until 2017. Last two elections, he appointed others to run for elections while retaining his party leadership.

On the 13th anniversary of its Independence, Kosovo is found with new leadership. This has raised eyebrows both in country and internationally. There is a dilemma of whether LVV and Albin Kurti as Prime Minister will lead Kosovo forward, based on his ideological actions which have produced social polarization through his exclusive narratives of state capture, corruption and nationalistic agenda. Expectations of the Kosovo citizens for the Kurti government are high, but whether he will be able to meet these challenges in this term, remains to be seen.

Challenges of the Kurti Government

“You destroyed us.” 

That assessment by a senior Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy official summed up the feeling in Moscow during the immediate post-Cold War period.  As Nuclear Affairs Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, I made regular visits to the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy and nuclear facilities.  With my Russian counterparts we coordinated expert and Congressional visits to the “Nuclear Cities,” the once super-secret jewels in the Soviet nuclear archipelago.  Seeing those cities it was hard to disagree with him.  Curtains hung in disrepair, dusty pianos sat unplayed in formerly elegant ballrooms, and the general feeling in cities like Sarov, or Arzamas-16, was one of directionlessness and despair. The lifestyle of the nuclear elite was destroyed.

After the Cold War the U.S. developed an ambitious plan to take Russia’s nuclear weapons and nuclear expertise and render it less dangerous.  We had programs to safeguard nuclear materials, to upgrade security and accountability at weapons factories and nuclear repositories, programs to blend highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium for burning in U.S. nuclear plants, and programs to encourage weapons scientists to find other, peaceful pursuits, rather than selling out to rogue countries.  There were even plans to help the Nuclear Cities themselves thrive economically in a globalized world, using the scientific talent already there.  One of the last vestiges of that effort was discarded when Vladimir Putin withdrew Russia from the Plutonium agreement.

The swords to plowshares effort should have been just one piece of a larger effort to put Russia back on track.  But Russia never turned the corner and we did not think broadly enough.  The problem was the assistance, as good as it was for U.S. security and as helpful as it was to Russian government fiscal balances, did nothing for the average Russian.  It was invisible.  And Public Diplomacy counts.  How many Germans remember acts of kindness from American GI’s?  A bar of chocolate given to a hungry child was remembered and treasured for life.  We followed up with the Marshall Plan. With no visible support, Putin could create a narrative in which the West, and the U.S. in particular, wanted Russia to fail.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States needed to consolidate the security gains, surely, but also do more to put Russia on the right path.  How?  Leadership, a plan, and public diplomacy. Easy to say now I know.  We need to work on our end game to win the war, cold or hot, and then win the peace.  

The early elections of February 14 in Kosovo are being eagerly awaited by the citizens. The hope for change is great but what change it will be, remains to be seen after the 14th of February. The Guardian called it a ´wave of anti-corruption´ and some dozens of left wing philosophers led by world infamous Slavoj Zizek sent a letter in support of the current opposition leader, Albin Kurti who is leading a campaign under the slogan “All and Straight.”

A big competition is taking place mainly between the three largest political parties in the country, for the next term of government. Electoral campaign that gathers thousands of citizens in times of pandemics, looks terrifying and a new wave of infected people with COVID 19 will be the highest bill of this campaign which citizens will pay in the end.

At a time when Kosovo is at a political and economic crossroads, a part of the political factor, with its military past, is not part of the electoral competition for the first time in Kosovo. Former President Hashim Thaci and former Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) leader Kadri Veseli and several other former KLA[1] members are facing war crimes charges in The Hague.

February 14 at this stage for Kosovo is seen as a challenge in itself. Will the political scene in Kosovo continue to be so polarized or will early elections produce another fragile government that could affect Kosovo’s role in the region and beyond, as well as in talks with Serbia? It remains to be seen after February 14th.

The establishment of official relations between Israel and Kosovo and mutual recognition sent a signal to the opposing countries of the Kosovo statehood and with that also the EU non recognizing fiver that are Spain, Greece, Cypruss, Romania and Slovakia. EU has not been a supporter of the Independence of Kosovo since its declaration on the 17th of February 2008 but supported Kosovo on its European perspective and European integrations in various ways. However, the EU support has not always been in line with the Kosovo’s foreign policy. One of the cases is also the negotiations mediated by President Trump and the Agreement signed at the White House where Kosovo managed to secure the recognition by the state of Israel.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between Kosovo and Israel is seen by many as the beginning of another round of recognitions expected for Kosovo despite Kosovo being in a challenging political crossroad with difficult elections in February 2021 and its Kosovo Liberation Army accused of war crimes. Diplomatic relations between Israel and Kosovo is a signal that Kosovo has been accepted as a unique situation or what international lawyers like to call ‘a sui generis case,’ which was a problematic issue especially for Cyprus, Romania and Spain due to secessionist movements in their own countries. Similarly, Israel’s progress in establishing diplomatic relations with Morocco and UAE, and Kosovo being recognized by Israel, is a good indicator for the progress both in the troubling Balkans and Middle East despite political capitalization from President Trump and Prime Minister Natanyahu as well as Prime Minister Hoti of Kosovo. Serbia’s President Vucic, was not very happy about this outcome yet he signed a document that committed to ‘normalization of economic relations with Kosovo’ on September 4th 2020 at the White House together with Prime Minister Hoti of Kosovo in an audience with President Trump.

What stirred EU politics lately as well as Turkish foreign ministry is this act of diplomatic mutual relations where Kosovo officially declared that it will open its Embassy to Israel in Jerusalem. Peter Stano, an EU Foreign Policy Spokesperson, declared that the EU position is that the embassies of EU countries should be located in Tel Aviv. Stano had reacted the same even after the Washington agreement on September 4 last year, he had expressed “serious concern and regret regarding the warning that Serbia and Kosovo will establish embassies in Jerusalem. Similar reaction was received from the Turkish MFA in reaction against such decision by Kosovo Government. Kosovo Government’s stand is that it will open the Embassy in Jerusalem as soon as conditions allow, which means practically, once the pandemic lock down is over.

Despite Serbia’s promise to do the same, they are yet to do such an act. EU has not reacted to Serbia yet and has not reacted against Serbia even at the time when the so called ‘stabilization agreement’ was signed at the White House. Serbia’s politics flows from alliances with China and Russia on several fronts including the 5G untrusted vendors installed by Huaiwei in Belgrade beginning from last year to arms deals with Russia and installation of Russian defense technology in Serbia as well as military bases such as the one near Nis. The flirt of East-West of Serbia is almost unnoticed despite President Vucic’s declarations that EU is like a stepmother to Serbia whereas he called Xi Jinping, a brother when China donated medical supplies to fight the pandemic situation in Serbia. Vucic accused EU of closing the border and turning its back to Serbia when they needed.

Serbia’s foreign policy in a hybrid situation with EU and members states of the EU as Serbian Foreign Policy mostly consists of playing a double-edged sword, receiving donations from the EU and playing the ‘non-allied’ card when needed. For historic reasons such as NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, Serbia is at large in a alienated feelings with NATO and NATO members as well. Yet, EU and NATO rarely seem to react towards Serbian foreign policy of same nature with Kosovo. Such is the case with deployment of Embassies in Jerusalem.